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Abstract. We repurpose existing RSA/ECC co-processors for (ideal) lattice-based
cryptography by exploiting the availability of fast long integer multiplication. Such
co-processors are deployed in smart cards in passports and identity cards, secured
microcontrollers and hardware security modules (HSM). In particular, we demonstrate
an implementation of a variant of the Module-LWE-based Kyber Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) that is tailored for high performance on a commercially available
smart card chip (SLE 78). To benefit from the RSA/ECC co-processor we use
Kronecker substitution in combination with schoolbook and Karatsuba polynomial
multiplication. Moreover, we speed-up symmetric operations in our Kyber variant
using the AES co-processor to implement a PRNG and a SHA-256 co-processor to
realise hash functions. This allows us to execute CCA-secure Kyber768 key generation
in 79.6 ms, encapsulation in 102.4 ms and decapsulation in 132.7 ms.
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1 Introduction
The development of an efficient quantum order-finding algorithm by Shor [Sho97] invali-
dated the quantum hardness of factoring and discrete logarithms in Abelian groups. Since
then, there has been a growing effort to develop new public-key encryption and signature
algorithms that can resist cryptanalysis using large-scale general quantum computers. The
resulting constructions are referred to as “quantum safe” or “post-quantum”. Popular
families are code-based, multivariate, isogeny-based and lattice-based cryptography.
In 2016 the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a
several year long process to standardise post-quantum cryptographic schemes [Nat16].
Furthermore, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) created a
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quantum-safe cryptography working group [CCD+15] and in 2016 Google conducted its
first post-quantum cryptography at-scale test [Lan16]. Whatever we may think of the
timeline or even plausibility of the arrival of general quantum computers, quantum-safe
cryptography is gaining momentum.
From a practical perspective, two crucial requirements are efficiency and ease of
deployment of newly proposed schemes. Indeed, submissions to the NIST process are
encouraged to provide optimised software implementations aimed at general purpose
microprocessors. However, implementations of quantum-safe schemes are also required in
constrained (often embedded) environments such as microcontrollers or smart cards.
In the smart-card setting, low-power general purpose 16 or 32-bit CPUs are com-
monly augmented by cryptographic co-processors capable of executing Diffie-Hellman key
exchanges, encryptions or signatures based on RSA or elliptic curves. As such, these
cryptographic co-processors come equipped with an integer multiplier capable of handling
multiplication (and addition) in ZN for log2N ≈ 2048.
Contribution. In this work, we repurpose existing cryptographic co-processors to acceler-
ate lattice-based cryptography. For this we make use of variants of Kronecker substitution
combined with low-degree polynomial arithmetic. Using this strategy, we manage to
implement a variant of the Kyber Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) [SAB+17] using
the Kyber768 parameter set promising 161 bits of security.1 Our various implementations
target a commercially available smart card (SLE 78 with 16 Kbyte RAM) and its RSA, AES,
and SHA-256 co-processor. To evaluate Kronecker substitution we implement standard
Kronecker substitution (KS1) together with Karatsuba-based polynomial multiplication
and Kronecker with negated evaluation points (KS2) [Har09] using schoolbook-based
polynomial multiplication. We compare our results with an implementation of Kyber and
NewHope on the same target device that are not utilising large integer multiplication on
the co-processor, implementations of RSA as well as related work. In summary, our work
provides evidence that lattice-based post-quantum cryptography can be competitive with
RSA on contactless high-security 16-bit smart cards with only limited RAM when RSA,
AES and SHA-2 co-processors are used.
Approach & outline. The key computational task in {Ring, Module}-LWE encryption/de-
cryption is to evaluate
MulAdd
(
a(x), b(x), c(x), f(x), q
)
:= a(x) · b(x) + c(x) mod (f(x), q)
for polynomials a(x), b(x), c(x) ∈ Zq[x]/(f(x)). In this work, we realise the MulAdd
gadget using a combination of a variant of Kronecker substitution [VZGG13, p. 245] and
low-degree polynomial arithmetic in the spirit of Schönhage’s trick [Sch77]. Kronecker
substitution is a well-known and well-utilised technique in computer algebra to reduce
polynomial multiplication to integer multiplication. Briefly, we start from standard
Kronecker substitution by considering a(2`) · b(2`) + c(2`) mod f(2`) where e.g. a(2`)
represents the integer obtained by evaluating a(x) at 2` for some sufficiently big integer
`. However, for typical parameter choices, e.g. those of Kyber or NewHope [ADPS16],
this strategy produces integers too large for our hardware multiplier to handle. Thus, in
Section 3 we apply a variant of Harvey [Har09] to our use-case. Harvey proposed Kronecker
variants which permit to half the required bitsize of the integers being multiplied at the
cost of doubling the number of multiplications. This provides a worthwhile trade-off for
medium-sized integers where quasi-linear integer multiplication algorithms are not yet
competitive. However, in our context Harvey’s technique on its own still does not suffice to
1We stress that our variant of Kyber is not interoperable with Kyber as specified in [SAB+17]. The
main differences are choices for symmetric functions and that Kyber explicitly requires the usage of the
Number Theoretic Transform (NTT), which we cannot realise efficiently with our approach.
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reduce the integer operands to match our hardware multiplier. Thus, we utilise (low-degree)
polynomial arithmetic on top. Overall, we obtain an implementation which computes the
IND-CCA Kyber768 decapsulation in 8 · (32 + 3 + 3) = 120 modular multiplications of
2049-bit numbers. In contrast, decrypting 2048-bit RSA requires roughly 2·1.5·1024 = 3072
multiplications of 1024-bit numbers in Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) representation.2
We describe our implementation in detail in Section 5, discuss performance in Section 6
and finish with a discussion in Section 7.
Large modulus LWE. In lattice-based cryptography, noisy variants of Kronecker sub-
stitution have been used to show various polynomial-time equivalences. In [BLP+13] a
reduction from n-dimensional LWE with modulus q to 1-dimensional LWE with modulus
qn is provided using
A :=
n−1∑
i=0
aiq
i, S :=
n−1∑
i=0
siq
n−i−1, A · S mod qn ≈ 〈~a,~s〉 · qn−1. (1)
This reduction is extended to the Approximate-GCD problem in [CS15]. In [CLT13],
a variant of the Approximate-GCD problem is defined for realising fully homomorphic
encryption which permits to pack several plaintext bits into one big integer using the CRT.
The reduction from [BLP+13] is extended in [AD17] to a reduction from Module-LWE
to large modulus Ring-LWE and a dimension-halving, modulus squaring self-reduction
of Ring-LWE. In [Chu17], it is noted that given A :=
∑n−1
i=0 aiq
i, S :=
∑n−1
i=0 siq
i and
c(x) = a(x) · s(x) mod xn + 1, we have
A · S mod (qn + 1) ≈s
n−1∑
i
ciq
i
where ≈s means ≈ in each “slot” defined by multiples of q. This observation then gives rise
to the I-RLWE problem, which also permits packing several plaintext bits into one large
integer. In [Chu17], a reduction from Ring-LWE to I-RLWE is given, but this reduction
does not consider the noise distribution, only its size.3 In [Ham17], a variant of I-RLWE
over a pseudo-Mersenne field is given to instantiate an MLWE KEM. Similarly, [AJPS17]
can be considered as an integer variant of NTRU.
Post-quantum cryptography on microcontrollers. Microcontrollers and embedded pro-
cessors usually have only very limited amount of available RAM, space to store program
code and operate with relatively simple 8-, 16-, or 32-bit processor architectures. They
are sometimes also referred to as constrained devices and are mostly used in embedded
applications where low energy consumption, reduced device costs, and other aspects like
real-time capabilities are required. Such requirements are commonly not fulfilled by com-
puter systems or powerful System-on-Chips (SoC) with external non-volatile memory or
RAM. A special class of constrained devices are smart cards or chip cards which are used
in electronic banking, secured identification (e.g. passports or national ID cards), authenti-
cation, or transport and ticketing applications. Smart cards are usually equipped with
protection mechanisms against a wide range of invasive or non-invasive attacks and they
often feature dedicated accelerators to speed-up and to protect cryptographic operations
2Of course, this metric does not account for the cost of embedding of polynomials into integers as well
as additional operations required in lattice-based cryptography, like randomness sampling or expensive
CCA transformations. Moreover, the data structures in RSA are much smaller than in lattice-based
cryptography so that transfers between CPU and co-processors with internal memory appropriate to hold
RSA-2048 base, exponent, modulus and result have much less impact on performance.
3We note, though, that according to all known cryptanalysis results for public-key encryption based on
LWE, the noise distribution does not play a significant role if it provides enough entropy.
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(e.g. AES, ECC or RSA). Most commercial chip cards are certified according to Common
Criteria4 and evaluated in a laboratory.
The implementation of post-quantum cryptography on constrained devices is an active
research area. Most works in the literature focus on performance but from a practical
standpoint RAM consumption, code footprint and maintainability of the code-base are
also important metrics. Examples of PQC implementations are works that deal with
multivariate signatures [CHT12], code-based encryption [vMOG15] and hash-based signa-
tures [HRS16]. In the area of lattice-based cryptography, examples are an implementation
of NTRU [BSJ15], an implementation of BLISS signatures on 32-bit ARM [OPG14], an
implementation of CPA-secure public-key encryption based on Ring-LWE on an 8-bit
AVR [LPO+17a] and 32-bit ARM [dCRVV15]. An implementation of the NewHope key ex-
change protocol which is similar to Ring-LWE encryption is given in [AJS16]. In [KMRV18]
an implementation of Saber is provided which is an MLWE-based KEM that does not rely
on the NTT for polynomial multiplication.
Similarly, the protection of lattice-based cryptography against side-channel attacks
has already been explored. An implementation of a masked decryption of Ring-LWE
CPA-secure PKE is described in [RdCR+16] and an implementation of a CCA-secure and
masked variant is given in [OSPG18]. A masked implementation of the GLP signature
scheme is provided in [BBE+18]. What has received comparably less attention in the
literature so far are flexible cryptographic co-processors for lattice-based cryptography
in the spirit of RSA or ECC co-processors (cf. [SBPV07]) and instruction set extensions
(cf. a multiply-accumulate instruction [Wen13]).
2 Preliminaries
For x ∈ R, we write dxc to mean the closest integer to x (where dy + 12c := y+ 1 for y ∈ Z).
For a, b ∈ Z, we write a mod(+) b for the unique integer aˆ ≡ a mod b such that 0 ≤ aˆ < b.
We write a mod(−) b for the unique integer aˆ ≡ a mod b such that −b/2 ≤ aˆ < b/2. We
extend this definition to tuples, vectors, matrices and polynomials a over Z component-wise.
We also write [a]b for a mod
(+) b. We often write {a, . . . , b} to mean the set [a, b] ∩ Z.
We write
JconditionK := {1 if condition is true,
0 if condition is false.
.
Unless stated otherwise, we let R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) where n is a power of 2, and
let Rq = R/(q) for some positive integer q. We let Rk (resp. Rkq ) be a ring module of
dimension k over R (resp. Rq). Throughout we identify equivalence classes in Rq with
their representative polynomial with coefficients mod(−) q, and its lifted versions in R
and in Z[x].
Given a set S and a probability distribution D over S we write s r←− D to mean s ∈ S
sampled according to D using coins r, and s r←− S to mean s ∈ S sampled uniformly
random from S with coins r. We may omit coins, in which case we write $←−. We denote by
~v tuples in Sk, and use capital letters for matrices ~M ∈ Sk×k. We write t← v to assign
value v to variable t inside algorithms. Inside algorithms, we refer to the ith entry in an
array a as a(i). If a variable v gets overwritten as part of a loop (e.g. v ← v/2), we may
refer to the variable v after step i of the loop as v[i] (e.g. v[i] ← v[i−1]/2).
2.1 Hard problems
All schemes considered in this work relate to the Learning with Errors problem [Reg09].
4See http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products/#IC.
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Definition 1 (LWE [Reg09]). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability distribution
on Z and ~s be a secret vector in Znq . We denote by Ls,χ the probability distribution on
Znq ×Zq obtained by choosing ~a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ Z according to χ
and considering it in Zq, and returning (~a, c) = (~a, 〈~a,~s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq.
Decision-LWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (~a, c) ∈ Znq × Zq are sampled
according to Ls,χ or the uniform distribution on Znq × Zq.
Search-LWE is the problem of recovering ~s from (~a, c) = (~a, 〈~a,~s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq sampled
according to Ls,χ.
Decision- and Search-LWE are polynomial-time equivalent [Reg09]. Since LWE leads
to public-key sizes at least quadratic in the security parameter, many schemes are based on
its ring variant, aptly called Ring-LWE [LPR10] or “RLWE” in short. Below, we give the
definition of Polynomial-LWE [SSTX09] (or “PLWE”) which is equivalent to the RLWE
definition for power-of-two cyclotomic rings. For e.g. prime cyclotomic ring these two
definitions are not equivalent, i.e. the geometry of the error distribution changes somewhat.
However, as is common in the literature, we will abuse notation and refer to PLWE as
RLWE.
Definition 2 (RLWE [SSTX09, LPR10]). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability
distribution on Z and s be a secret polynomial in Rq. We denote by Ls,χ the probability
distribution on Rq×Rq obtained by choosing a ∈ Rq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ R
by sampling each of its coefficients according to χ and considering it in Rq, and returning
(a, c) = (a, a · s+ e) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
Decision-RLWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (a, c) ∈ Rq × Rq are sampled
according to Ls,χ or the uniform distribution on Rq ×Rq.
Search-RLWE is the problem of recovering s from (a, c) = (a, a · s+ e) ∈ Rq ×Rq sampled
according to Ls,χ.
The decision and search variants of RLWE are polynomial-time equivalent for cyclotomic
rings [LPR10]. The increased efficiency of RLWE compared to LWE is achieved by adding
algebraic structure. Informally, each RLWE sample can be viewed as n correlated LWE
samples. While, so far, no algorithm is known which exploits this additional structure,
some designs hedge against such attacks by considering instances which require the attacker
to find short vectors in a lattice of larger module rank [CDW17, SAB+17]. In particular,
Module-LWE (or “MLWE”) interpolates between the plain and the ring variants of LWE.
Definition 3 (MLWE [LS15]). Let n, q, k be positive integers, χ be a probability distri-
bution on Z and ~s be a secret module element in Rkq . We denote by Ls,χ the probability
distribution on Rkq ×Rq obtained by choosing ~a ∈ Rkq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ R
by sampling each of its coefficients according to χ and considering it in Rq, and returning
(~a, c) = (~a, 〈~a,~s〉+ e) ∈ Rkq ×Rq.
Decision-MLWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (~a, c) ∈ Rkq ×Rq are sampled
according to Ls,χ or the uniform distribution on Rkq ×Rq.
Search-MLWE is the problem of recovering ~s from (~a, c) = (~a, 〈~a,~s〉+e) ∈ Rkq ×Rq sampled
according to Ls,χ.
Again, the search and the decision variants of this problem are polynomial-time
equivalent [LS15, Thm. 4.7].
2.2 Kyber
A recent construction relying on the MLWE problem is the Kyber Key Encapsulation Mech-
anism. Kyber has been submitted to the NIST PQC standardisation process [SAB+17] and
a variant is also published as an academic paper [BDK+17]. It is defined by an intermediate
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IND-CPA secure Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme which is then transformed to
an IND-CCA secure KEM using a generic transform [HHK17].5 We note that Kyber
unambiguously refers to the IND-CCA secure KEM, i.e. [SAB+17] does not formally
propose a public-key encryption scheme nor a KEM which only claims IND-CPA security.
Definition 4 (Simplified Kyber.CPA following [BDK+17]; cf. [SAB+17]). For n = 256
let k, n, q, η, dt, du, dv be positive integers. LetM = {0, 1}n be the plaintext space, where
each message m ∈M can be seen as a polynomial in R with coefficients in {0, 1}. Define
the functions
Compressq(x, d) := d(2d/q) · xc mod(+) 2d ,
Decompressq(x, d) := d(q/2d) · xc,
let χ be a centered binomial distribution with support {−η, . . . , η}, and let χn be the
distribution of polynomials of degree n with entries independently sampled from χ. Define
the public-key encryption scheme Kyber.CPA = (Kyber.CPA.Gen, Kyber.CPA.Enc,
Kyber.CPA.Dec) as in Algorithms 1, 2 and 3.
1 (ρ, σ) $←− {0, 1}256 × {0, 1}256 ;
2 ~A
ρ←− Rk×kq ;
3 (~s,~e) σ←− χkn × χkn ;
4 ~t← Compressq( ~A~s+ ~e, dt) ;
5 return pkCPA := (~t, ρ), skCPA := ~s ;
Algorithm 1: Kyber.CPA.Gen.
Input: pkCPA = (~t, ρ)
Input: m ∈M
Input: r $←− {0, 1}256
1 ~t← Decompressq(~t, dt) ;
2 ~A
ρ←− Rk×kq ;
3 (~r,~e1, e2)
r←− χkn × χkn × χn ;
4 ~u← Compressq( ~AT~r + ~e1, du) ;
5 v ← Compressq(
〈
~t, ~r
〉
+ e2 + d q2c ·m, dv) ;
6 return c := (~u, v) ;
Algorithm 2: Kyber.CPA.Enc.
Input: skCPA = ~s
Input: c = (~u, v)
1 ~u← Decompressq(~u, du) ;
2 v ← Decompressq(v, dv) ;
3 return Compressq(v − 〈~s, ~u〉 , 1) ;
Algorithm 3: Kyber.CPA.Dec.
In Kyber, the parameters that define the base ring Rq are fixed at n = 256 and
q = 7681. The parameters that define key and ciphertext compression are also fixed and
set to du = 11, dv = 3 and dt = 11. The three different security levels are obtained by
different choices of k and η. All relevant Kyber parameters are summarised in Table 1.
5We note that [SAB+17] does not include the Targhi-Unruh tag.
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Table 1: Parameters proposed to NIST for instantiating Kyber KEM.
Parameter Set n q k η q. bit-sec. NIST level failure |pk| |sk| |ctxt|
Kyber512 256 7681 2 5 102 1 2−145 736 1632 800
Kyber768 256 7681 3 4 161 3 2−142 1088 2400 1152
Kyber1024 256 7681 4 3 218 5 2−169 1440 3168 1504
Sizes of the public key (|pk|), secret key (|sk|), and ciphertext (|ctxt|) are given in bytes.
The performance of an implementation of Kyber depends highly on the speed of the
polynomial multiplication algorithm and the performance of the PRNG instantiations
as a large number of pseudo random data is required when generating ~A ρ←− Rk×kq or
when sampling noise from χkn. Regarding operations in Rq, Kyber.CPA.Gen requires
the computation of k2 multiplications and (k − 1)k + k additions (line 4 of Algorithm 1).
For encryption as defined in Kyber.CPA.Enc, k2 multiplications and (k − 1)k + k
additions (line 4 of Algorithm 2) as well as k multiplications and (k − 1) + 2 additions
(line 5) are needed. The decryption routine Kyber.CPA.Dec can be implemented with k
multiplications and k − 1 + 1 additions (line 3 of Algorithm 3). Note that Kyber specifies
a Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). The NTT allows to implement a fast polynomial
multiplication by computing c = NTT−1(NTT(a) ◦ NTT(b)) for a, b, c ∈ Rq, where ◦
denotes coefficient-wise multiplication. Kyber exploits that the NTT is a one-to-one map
and assumes that randomly sampled polynomials in ~A are already in the transformed
domain. Thus, an implementation using a different multiplication algorithm than the
NTT would have to apply an inverse transformation first and then use the polynomial
multiplication algorithm of its choice to stay compatible with the original specification.
Given two hash functions G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}2×256 and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}256, Kyber
is obtained from Kyber.CPA using a Fujisaki-Okamoto style transform from [HHK17] as
shown in Algorithms 4, 5, 6. Within Kyber.Decaps a re-encryption has to be computed
whose result is compared to the received ciphertext. Thus Kyber specifies exactly how to
generate the uniformly random matrix ~A as well as polynomials from the error distribution
χn from a seed. For this the authors of Kyber have chosen different instantiations from
the SHA3 family (SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256, SHA3-256 and SHA3-512).
1 ((~t, ρ), ~s)← Kyber.CPA.Gen() ;
2 z
$←− {0, 1}256 ;
3 h← H((~t, ρ)) ;
4 return pk := (~t, ρ), sk := (~s,~t, ρ, h, z) ;
Algorithm 4: Kyber.Gen.
Input: pk = (~t, ρ)
1 m
$←− {0, 1}256 ;
2 m← H(m) ;
3 (Kˆ, r)← G(m,H(pk)) ;
4 (~u, v)← Kyber.CPA.Enc(pk,m; r) ;
5 c← (~u, v) ;
6 K ← H(Kˆ,H(c)) ;
7 return (c,K) ;
Algorithm 5: Kyber.Encaps.
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Input: sk = (~s,~t, ρ, h, z)
Input: c = (~u, v)
1 m′ ← Kyber.CPA.Dec(~s, (~u, v)) ;
2 (Kˆ ′, r′)← G(m′, h) ;
3 (~u′, v′)← Kyber.CPA.Enc(pk,m′; r′) ;
4 if (~u′, v′) = (~u, v) then
5 K ← H(Kˆ ′, H(c)) ;
6 else
7 K ← H(z,H(c)) ;
8 end
9 return K ;
Algorithm 6: Kyber.Decaps.
2.3 Target platform
We use an Infineon SLE78CLUFX5000 chip card6 with 16 Kbyte RAM and 500 Kbyte
NVM which features a 16-bit CPU running at 50 MHz. The target chip is equipped
with common peripherals (watchdog, timers), internal security functions and encryption
procedures, a True Random Number Generator (TRNG), as well as a symmetric co-
processor to accelerate AES, a co-processor to compute SHA-256 and an asymmetric
co-processor for RSA and ECC acceleration. The chip allows contact-based as well as
contactless operation where it is powered by a field generated by a common smart card
reader. It is intended for use in applications like passports, identity cards, access control or
payment cards (e.g. banking, value or credit cards). A similar target device from the SLE
78 family has previously been used to implement hash-based XMSS signatures [HBB13] or
eta pairings [GK15].
The asymmetric co-processor on the SLE78CLUFX5000 allows fast basic long number
calculations on integers slightly larger than 2048 bits (addition, subtraction, integer
multiplication, modular multiplication). In practice it is mainly used by cryptographic
libraries for RSA and ECC. However, for an earlier generation smart card (Infineon
SLE66P) Garcia and Seifert describe an implementation of AES on the modular arithmetic
co-processor [GS02].
As there is no standard for RSA/ECC co-processors our low-level implementation
is certainly vendor specific. However, the general approach described in Section 3 and
Section 4 should be transferable to a large number of devices as most other smart card
vendors appear to use similar approaches. Additional devices that could profit from our
work could be server systems like the IBM PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor7 or existing
FPGA-based RSA/ECC accelerator cards or RSA/ECC accelerator IP.
3 Kronecker
Kronecker substitution is a classical technique in computer algebra for reducing polynomial
arithmetic to large integer arithmetic, cf. [VZGG13, p. 245] and [Har09]. The fundamental
idea behind this technique is that univariate polynomial and integer arithmetic are identical
except for carry propagation in the latter. Thus, coefficients are simply packed into an
integer in such a way as to terminate any possible carry chain. For example, say, we want
to multiply two polynomials f(x) := x + 2 with g(x) := 3x + 4 in Z[x]. We may write
6We refer to https://www.infineon.com/cms/de/product/security-smart-card-solutions/
security-controllers/sle-78/ for more information on the SLE 78 family.
7See http://www-304.ibm.com/jct01003c/common/ssi/ShowDoc.wss?docURL=/common/ssi/rep_sm/1/
649/ENUS4767-_h01/index.html.
8
f(100) = 100 + 2 = 102 and g(100) = 300 + 4 = 304. Multiplying gives 102 · 304 = 31008
or 3x2 + 10x+ 8. In implementations, we use powers of two as evaluation points since this
permits efficient “packing” (polynomial to integer) and “unpacking” (integer to polynomial)
using only cheap bit shifts.
In this work, we employ Kronecker substitution for computing
MulAdd
(
a(x), b(x), c(x), f(x)
)
:= a(x) · b(x) + c(x) mod f(x)
with all polynomials having signed coefficients from different ranges.
In more detail, we first pack the polynomials into integers A,B,C, F using Algorithm 7
(Snort). We then compute D := A ·B+C mod F . Finally, we unpack D to d(x) using Al-
gorithm 8 (Sneeze). We note that our packing/unpacking algorithms are straight-forward
adaptations of standard Kronecker packing/unpacking to the signed case, cf. [Har09]. We
give high-level, proof-of-concept Sage [S+17] implementations for the algorithms in this
section in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 establishes the correctness of this procedure. While correctness of Kronecker
substitution is well-established and signed coefficients are usually easily covered by bit
shifts [Har09], we give a complete proof of correctness and in particular the required
precision in order to maintain the same error as in Kyber, since faithful re-encryption
is required for standard IND-CCA transforms such as the one in [HHK17] utilised by
Kyber. On the other hand, loosening this requirement, permits to decrease precision (the
parameter ` below) and hence to improve performance.
Input: g ∈ Z[x]
Input: f ∈ Z[x]
Input: bitlength `
1 return g(2`) mod(+) f(2`) ;
Algorithm 7: Snort(g, f, `).
Input: G ∈ {0, . . . , f(2`)− 1}
Input: f ∈ Z[x], monic
Input: bitlength `
1 n← deg(f) ;
2 G[−1] ← G ;
3 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 do // step i
4 e(i) ← G[i−1] mod(+) 2` ;
5 G[i] ← (G[i−1] − e(i)) /2` ;
6 if e(i) > 2`−1 then // negative coefficient
7 e(i) ← e(i) − 2` ;
8 G[i] ← G[i] + 1 ;
9 end
10 r(i) ← e(i) ;
11 end
12 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 do r(i) ← r(i) − fiG[n−1] ; // subtract b · f(x)
13 return {r(i)}n−1i=0 ;
Algorithm 8: Sneeze(G, f, `).
Lemma 1. Let a, b, c ∈ Z[x] such that a = ∑n−1i=0 aixi, b = ∑n−1i=0 bixi, c = ∑n−1i=0 cixi
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with ai ∈ {−α, . . . , α}, bi ∈ {−β, . . . , β}, and ci ∈ {−γ, . . . , γ}. Let
d :=
n−1∑
i=0
di x
i ≡ a · b+ c mod f
with di ∈ {−δ, . . . , δ}, where δ > 0 depends on α, β, γ, n, f and f is monic of degree n
such that f(2`) > 2n` − 1. Let ϕ := maxi<n |fi|, and let ` > log2(δ + ϕ) + 1 be an integer
(e.g. ` = dlog2(δ + ϕ+ 1)e+ 1).
If
A := Snort(a, f, `),
B := Snort(b, f, `),
C := Snort(c, f, `),
and
D := A ·B + C mod(+) f(2`),
then Sneeze (D, f, `) returns {r(i)}n−1i=0 where r(i) = di for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Corollary 1 (Power of two cyclotomic). Let α, β, γ be as above, let n be a power of 2,
and let f(x) = xn + 1. Let δ := nαβ + γ. Then Lemma 1 applies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 2 (Prime cyclotomic). Let α, β, γ be as above, let n = p− 1 where p is prime,
and let f =
∑n
i=0 x
i. Let δ := (2n− 1)αβ + γ. Then Lemma 1 applies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1. We need to uniquely encode any possible d as an integer modulo f(2`).
Since the coefficients di are ` bits long, and we need to store n of them, this means that
we require f(2`) > 2n` − 1.
When Sneeze is called, we set
G[−1] := D = A ·B + C mod(+) f(2`).
Since d ≡ a · b+ c mod f , it follows by explicit computation that
G[−1] = D =
n−1∑
i=0
di 2`i + b f(2`)
where the last equality is over the integers, for some b ∈ Z. Given that∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
i=0
di 2`i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ 2n` − 12` − 1 ≤ (2`−1 − 1) 2n` − 12` − 1 < 2n`−1,
the assumption that f(2`) > 2n` − 1 > 2n`−1 implies that b ∈ {0, 1}.
The main computation in Sneeze is done between lines 3 and 11, hence we define
some conditions on the output of that loop and prove they hold by induction.
Claim. After step i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have
r(i) = di + b fi (2)
and
G[i] =
n−1∑
j=i+1
dj 2`(j−i−1) + b
n∑
j=i+1
fj 2(j−i−1)` (3)
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Assume Conditions 2, 3 hold for step i− 1 ≥ 0. We start by assigning
e(i) = G[i−1] mod(+) 2`
=
n−1∑
r=i
dr 2`(r−i) + b
n∑
j=i
fj 2(j−i)` mod(+) 2`
= di + b fi + ti 2`
for some ti ∈ Z such that e(i) ∈ {0, . . . , 2` − 1}. Similar to before, by definition of ` and
the fact that b ∈ {0, 1}, we have
|di + b fi| ≤ δ + ϕ < 2`−1 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (4)
Hence ti ∈ {0, 1} for i < n. We then set
G[i] = G
[i−1] − e(i)
2`
=
n−1∑
r=i+1
dr 2`(r−i−1) + b
n∑
j=i+1
fj 2(j−i−1)` − ti
and balance e(i) (mod 2`). By the size consideration made in Inequality 4, this amounts
to subtracting ti2` from e(i). We keep account of this subtraction by adding back ti to
x(i). Finally, we assign r(i) ← e(i). Hence Conditions 2, 3 hold for step i ≥ 1. Similarly,
we can see that Conditions 2, 3 also hold for step i = 0, proving the claim.
By Condition 3, after step i = n − 1 we have G[n−1] = b < 2`, which would become
the coefficient of an nth power of x in d. Line 12 takes care of reducing this modulo f ,
which results in assigning
r(i) ← r(i) − fiG[n−1] = di + b fi − fi b = di for all i < n,
completing the proof.
Since operating on G[i] involves integer arithmetic on n` bit integers, we may modify
Algorithm 8 to correct carries on e(i) in order to avoid executing line 8 of Algorithm 8.
This variant of the algorithm is given as Algorithm 9. Note that with this change the only
large integer operations are division with remainder modulo 2` and thus cheap, while the
final output of the algorithm is the same.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be directly adapted to the MLWE setting where we let{
ai =
n−1∑
j=0
ai,jx
j
}κ
i=1
,
{
bi =
n−1∑
j=0
bi,jx
j
}κ
i=1
, c =
n−1∑
j=0
cjx
j
with ai,j ∈ {−α, . . . , α}, bi,j ∈ {−β, . . . , β}, and cj ∈ {−γ, . . . , γ} and want to compute∑κ
i=1 ai · bi + c (mod f), by letting
` > log2(κ(δ − γ) + γ + ϕ) + 1.
Overall, we arrive at the following corollary.
Corollary 3 (KyberMulAdd). Let {ai, bi}κi=1, c ⊂ Z[x], be as above, with α =
⌊
q
2
⌋
, and
β = γ = η, and let f = xn + 1. Let
` > log2
(
κn
⌊q
2
⌋
η + η + 1
)
+ 1
be an integer. Let Ai := Snort(ai, f, `), Bi := Snort(bi, f, `), C := Snort(c, f, `),
and D := ~A · ~B + C mod(+) f(2`). Then Sneeze (D, f, `) returns d := ∑κi=1 ai · bi + c
(mod f).
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Remark 1. From d ∈ R, the result in Rq can be obtained by coefficient-wise modular
reduction.
Input: G ∈ {0, . . . , f(2`)− 1}
Input: f ∈ Z[x], monic
Input: bitlength `
1 n← deg(f) ;
2 G[−1] ← G, c ← 0 ;
3 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 do // step i
4 e(i) ← G[i−1] mod(+) 2` ;
5 G[i] ← (G[i−1] − e(i)) /2` ;
6 e(i) ← e(i) + c ;
7 if e(i) > 2`−1 then e(i) ← e(i) − 2`, c ← 1 else c ← 0 ;
8 r(i) ← e(i) ;
9 end
10 for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 do r(i) ← r(i) − fi (G[n−1] + c) ; // subtract b · f(x)
11 return {r(i)}n−1i=0 ;
Algorithm 9: Sneeze-Fast(G, f, `). Same as Sneeze, but avoiding large integer
arithmetic for carry propagation.
3.1 Compact Kronecker
In [Har09], David Harvey presents two improved packing techniques for Kronecker sub-
stitution, reducing integer sizes at the cost of performing more multiplications: KS2 or
“negated evaluation points” evaluates at
(
2`,−2`) and KS3 or “reciprocal evaluation points”
evaluates at
(
2`, 2−`
)
. Each technique halves the required integer bit size at the cost of
performing two multiplications. Note that integer arithmetic is super-linear (e.g. Karatsuba
multiplication is used for medium-sized inputs and has a cost of 3log2 L for integers of size
L, see below) and thus this trade-off produces a noticeable speed-up. The two techniques
are orthogonal and can be combined, which reduces bit sizes by a factor of four at the cost
of increasing the number of multiplications to four. The combined algorithm is referred to
as KS4.
The KS2 algorithm proceeds as follows. Assume a(x), b(x) are such that their product
c(x) := a(x) · b(x) has positive coefficients bounded by 22`. Let
c(+) := c(2`) = a(2`) · b(2`) =
∑
[i]2=0
ci 2i` +
∑
[i]2=1
ci 2i`
c(−) := c(−2`) = a(−2`) · b(−2`) =
∑
[i]2=0
ci 2i` −
∑
[i]2=1
ci 2i`
Then, we can recover the even coefficients of c(x) from
c(+) + c(−) = c(2`) + c(−2`) = 2
∑
[i]2=0
ci 2i`
and the odd coefficients from
c(+) − c(−) = c(2`)− c(−2`) = 2 · 2`
∑
[i]2=1
ci 2(i−1)`
12
since the sum and the difference cancel out either the even or the odd powers. The
coefficients can be either read directly with care to their offset, or dividing the above
quantities by the appropriate power of 2 over the integers.
The KS2 algorithm is compatible with arithmetic modulo f = xn + 1, when n is even.
When doing this over Zf(2`) some care must be taken since reducing c(·) modulo f(2`)
may change its parity. In such case the coefficients can be recovered by either multiplying
c(+) + c(−) by 2−1 mod(+) f(2`) and c(+) − c(−) by 2−`−1 mod(+) f(2`), or multiplying
both quantities by a desired power of 2 modulo f(2`) and reading the coefficients with the
appropriate offset. Packing and unpacking are identical to standard Kronecker substitution,
i.e. the proof of Lemma 1 applies directly when working with such an f .
On the other hand, adapting packing and unpacking to combine the KS3 algorithm
with modular reduction is somewhat more involved, requiring a fair amount of careful bit
shifting. Implementing this strategy would roughly half the number of multiplications
required at the cost of a more involved packing/unpacking algorithm. However, since our
packing and unpacking routines already take time comparable to the actual multiplications
they facilitate and since our target platform does not have efficient bit-shift operations, we
did not attempt an implementation of KS3 or KS4.
4 Splitting the ring
Commercially available multipliers are usually capable of evaluating (x, y, z) 7→ x · y
(mod z) where log x, log y, log z < m for some fixed value of m which may be lower than
what is required to apply Lemma 1 directly. In fact, for typical parameter sizes of lattice-
based cryptography and of RSA, this is expected to be the case. Thus, in this section –
where we focus on f = xn + 1 with n a power of two – we explain our strategy for utilising
these “too small” multipliers.
Let a(x), b(x), c(x) be polynomials of degree < n as defined in Lemma 1 and let
` be the packing length used, we want to compute a(x) · b(x) + c(x) (mod f(x)). So
far we have considered two ways of doing this. First, we can pack every coefficient of
each polynomial individually in a large enough buffer, say of length `, and then directly
compute the result using polynomial arithmetic. Alternatively, we can use Lemma 1 and
evaluate a(2`) ·b(2`)+c(2`) mod(+) (2n` + 1) packing all the coefficients of each polynomial
at once in a buffer of length n` + 1, and then unpack the final result. A third option
consists of interpolating between these two methods by combining Kronecker substitution
with (typically low-degree) polynomial arithmetic in order to shorten the lengths of the
multiplier’s inputs. This approach is similar to fast integer multiplication algorithms by
Schönhage [Sch77] or Nussbaumer [Nus80] applying an FFT.
The idea is the following. Say we have
a(x) = a0 + a1 x+ a2 x2 + a3 x3 and b(x) = b0 + b1 x+ b2 x2 + b3 x3
and we want to compute a(x) · b(x) (mod x4 + 1), i.e.
(a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3)x3 + (a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2 − a3b3)x2
+(a1b0 + a0b1 − a3b2 − a2b3)x + a0b0 − a3b1 − a2b2 − a1b3
but we have a multiplier that would only let us work modulo x2 + 1 given the ` required
by Lemma 1. Letting y = x2, we can write a(x, y) = a(0)(y) + a(1)(y)x where
a(0)(y) = a0 + a2 y and a(1)(y) = a1 + a3 y,
and similarly for b = b(x, y). Then, computing a(x, y) · b(x, y) (mod y2 + 1) can be
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accomplished by packing A(·) = Snort(a(·)), B(·) = Snort(b(·)), and multiplying
Cˆ(x) := a(x, 2`) · b(x, 2`) mod(+) 22` + 1
= (A(0) +A(1) x) · (B(0) +B(1) x) mod(+) 22` + 1.
We obtain
(a1b1 − a3b3 + (a3b1 + a1b3) y)x2 + a0b0 − a2b2 + (a2b0 + a0b2) y
+(a1b0 + a0b1 − a3b2 − a2b3 + (a3b0 + a2b1 + a1b2 + a0b3) y)x
if we were to unpack the coefficients of Cˆ(x). Note that the coefficients on the second
line match our target, but the coefficients on the first line do not (they are not grouped
correctly and the signs do not necessarily match). This can be corrected by using the
identity y = x2 and thus rewriting x2 → y and reducing again modulo y2 + 1. From
our intermediate representation Cˆ(x) = Cˆ0 + Cˆ1 x+ Cˆ2 x2, this can be done by defining
C(x) = C0 + C1 x with
C0 := Cˆ0 + (2` · Cˆ2 mod(+) 22` + 1) mod(+) 22` + 1 and C1 = Cˆ1,
and then unpacking C(x) to obtain a · b (mod x4 + 1).
More generally, this can be formally described as follows. Let n = m · ω. Given a
polynomial p(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 pix
i of degree < n, we can set y = xm, and then rewrite p as
p(x, y) =
(
p0 + p0+m y + · · ·+ p0+(ω−1)m yω−1
)
x0
+
(
p1 + p1+m y + · · ·+ p1+(ω−1)m yω−1
)
x1
+ . . .
+
(
pm−1 + pm−1+m y + · · ·+ pm−1+(ω−1)m yω−1
)
xm−1
= p(0)(y) + p(1)(y)x+ · · ·+ p(m−1)(y)xm−1
where we write p(i)(y) :=
∑ω−1
j=0 pi+jm y
j , polynomials in y of degree < ω (i.e. p(i)
← Ff(p,m, i), cf. Algorithm 10). The idea is to pack each p(i), p ∈ {a, b, c}, into buffers
P (i) := p(i)(2`) mod(+) (2ω` + 1) of length ω`+ 1, and then evaluate
a(x, 2`) · b(x, 2`) + c(x, 2`) mod(+) (2ω` + 1),
where p(x, 2`) ≡∑mi=0 P (i) xi. By Lemma 1, the integer modulo operation will act on the
coefficients as reduction modulo yω + 1 ≡ xn + 1 (mod y − xm) would.
Working with polynomials a(x, y), b(x, y), the resulting polynomial a(x, y) · b(x, y) will
be a linear combination of monomials of the form yi xj . If we were to substitute xm = y
back now, we would obtain monomials of degree ≥ n every time that im+ j ≥ n, which
we do not want. Furthermore, depending on how we index the yi xj in our code, we
may be in need of combining (“grouping”) constant coefficients from different monomials
yi xj 6= yr xs mapping to the same power of x.
To better see what adjustments need to be done to the resulting polynomial in x, we
look at a(x, y) · b(x, y) (mod yω + 1) in detail.
a(x, y) · b(x, y) =
m−1∑
i,r=0
a(i)(y) b(r)(y)xi+r
=
m−1∑
i,r=0
ω−1∑
j,s=0
ai+jm br+sm y
j+s xi+r
≡
m−1∑
i,r=0
ω−1∑
j,s=0
(−1)Jj+s≥ωKai+jm br+sm y[j+s]ω xi+r (mod yω + 1)
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Given that y[j+s]ω xi+r ≡ xm·[j+s]ω + i+r (mod y − xm), we can see that after reducing
modulo yω + 1 it will be necessary to further reduce modulo y−xm whenever m · [j+ s]ω +
i+ r ≥ n, which can happen only if i+ r ≥ m. We do this by sending any monomial yj xi
where i ≥ m to yj+1 xi−m (mod yω + 1), or equivalently by mapping monomials xi with
i ≥ m to 2` xi−m, as done in Line 11 of Algorithm 11. This also takes care of groupings.
Then, we can simply Sneeze every coefficient to obtain the final result. The full procedure
results in Algorithms 10 and 11.
A possible optimisation could be that of choosing ` more aggressively. Indeed, we only
ever need to pack polynomials of degree ω, and hence we could use this value in place of
n. This would save ≈ logm bits per packed coefficient while still being able to perform
the reduction modulo yω + 1 ≡ 2ω` + 1, overall resulting in a saving of size ≈ ω logm
per packed polynomial p(i)(y). In this case one would need to unpack the P (i) before the
second reduction and final grouping, and handle these afterwards on the CPU.
Input: polynomial g ∈ R
Input: step size m, dividing n
Input: offset o
1 ω ← n/m ;
2 return
∑ω
j=0 gm·j+o x
j ;
Algorithm 10: Ff(g,m, o). Return a new polynomial containing every mth coefficient
of g, starting at offset o.
At the heart of Algorithm 11 is polynomial multiplication of two, typically low-degree,
polynomials in line 8. A straightforward choice to realise this multiplication is schoolbook
multiplication. This has quadratic complexity but is a simple algorithm. Another natural
option is Karatsuba multiplication. In its simplest form, the algorithm computes the
product a + b · x and c + d · x in Z[x] by computing the products t0 = a · c, t1 = b · d
and t2 = (a + b) · (c + d) = ac + ad + bc + bd and outputting t0 + (t2 − t0 − t1) ·
x + t2x2. It has a cost of 3dlog2 Le multiplications for degree L − 1 polynomials. We
note that finding better multiplication formulas for larger degrees is an active area of
research [Mon05, FH07, CÖ10, BDEZ12].
5 Implementation
Using the strategies outlined in Sections 3 and 4, we are now ready to fix an implementation
of Kyber and the KyberMulAdd gadget (see Corollary 3) using a big integer multiplier.
We focus on the Kyber768 parameter set (or more precisely a variant) and implement it on
the Infineon SLE 78 (SLE78CLUFX5000) equipped with an RSA, an AES and a SHA-256
co-processor and 16 Kbyte RAM. All our software is native code and written in C and
assembly language.
5.1 Description of Kyber using Kronecker
First we provide a description of our variant of Kyber.CPA that takes into account
Kronecker substitution. The algorithms closely resemble the implementation on our
target device and include certain optimisations for performance and reduction of memory
consumption.
In Algorithm 12 we describe our implementation of Kyber.CPA.Gen8 and follow
the notation of [SAB+17] where appropriate. The sampling of a uniform polynomial
ai,j ∈ ~A is done by Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) for a random seed ρ ∈ {0, 1}256 using an
8Instead of using SHA3-512 to hash the randomness, we directly take the output from the on-chip
TRNG using the TRNG(·) function; see below.
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Input: polynomial a(x) ∈ R
Input: polynomial b(x) ∈ R
Input: bitlength `
Input: width parameter ω, dividing n
1 f ← xω + 1 ;
2 m ← n/ω ;
// construct polynomials A(x), B(x) of degree < m
3 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
4 Ai ← Snort(Ff(a(x), m, i), f, `) ;
5 Bi ← Snort(Ff(b(x), m, i), f, `) ;
6 end
7 F ← 2ω` + 1 ;
// polynomial multiplication modulo integer F
8 Cˆ(x)← A(x) ·B(x) mod(+) F ;
// construct polynomial C(x) of degree < m
9 Cm−1 ← Cˆm−1 ;
10 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 2 do
11 Ci ← Cˆi +
(
2` · Cˆm+i mod(+) F
)
mod(+) F ;
12 end
// construct tuple cˆ of polynomials cˆi each of degree < ω
13 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
14 cˆi ← Sneeze (Ci, f, `) ;
15 end
// construct polynomial c(x) of degree < n
16 for i = 0, 1, . . . , ω − 1 do
17 for j = 0, . . . ,m− 1 do
18 cm·i+j ← (cˆj)i ;
19 end
20 end
21 return c(x) ;
Algorithm 11: a(x) ·b(x) mod xn+1 using an integer multiplier capable of performing
modular multiplication of integers up to ω`+ 1 bits.
Extendable Output Function (XOF) denoted as XOF(·). The sampling of a secret or
noise polynomial in Rq is described by CBD(PRF(σ,N)) where CBD stands for centred
binomial distribution and where PRF is a pseudorandom function (PRF) that takes a
random seed σ ∈ {0, 1}256 and an integer N for domain separation. In [SAB+17] it is
specified that PRF(σ,N) = SHAKE-256(σ,N) and that XOF = SHAKE-128.
With regard to arithmetic, it is easy to see that s0, . . ., sk−1 are used k times each, when
computing ~A · ~s. Thus a straightforward optimisation is to pack them into a big integer
only once. This resembles some similarity to the NTT, where it is also possible to achieve
speedups by the very simple observation that polynomials that are used several times have
to be transformed into the NTT domain only once. To obtain more control over the usage of
Snort and Sneeze, which is already integrated into the high-level gadgetKyberMulAdd,
we split KyberMulAdd into sub-functions. The Cˆ = MulAddSingle(A,B,C) function
takes as input A = Snort(a), B = Snort(b), C = Snort(c) for a, b, c ∈ Rq and computes
Dˆ(x) ← A(x) · B(x) + C(x) mod(+) F as specified in line 8 of Algorithm 11. The
D = FinalEll(Dˆ) function takes Dˆ and constructs the polynomial D(x) of degree < m
(line 11 of Algorithm 11) by multiplying by 2`. To save stack memory we do not generate
the full matrix ~A but only one coefficient after the other. All in all, our approach to
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key generation requires k2 + 2k calls to Snort, k2 big integer multiplications realised by
MulAddSingle and k calls to Sneeze as well as FinalEll.
1 ρ
$←− TRNG() ; // ρ ∈ {0, 1}256 sampled from internal TRNG
2 σ
$←− TRNG() ; // σ ∈ {0, 1}256 sampled from internal TRNG
3 N ← 0 ;
// Sample ~s and transform to ~S
4 for i = k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 0 do
5 stmp ← CBD(PRF(σ,N)) ;
6 N ← N + 1 ;
7 Si ← Snort(stmp) ;
8 end
// Compute ~A~s+ ~e
9 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 do
10 e← CBD(PRF(σ,N)) ;
11 N ← N + 1 ;
12 Tˆ ← Snort(e) ;
13 for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 do
14 atmp ← Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) ;
15 Atmp ← Snort(atmp) ;
16 Tˆ ←MulAddSingle(Atmp, Sj , Tˆ ) ;
17 end
18 T ← FinalEll(Tˆ ) ;
19 ti ← Sneeze(T ) ;
20 end
21 pk ← Encodedt(Compressq(~t, dt)||ρ) ;
22 sk ← Encode13(~s mod(+) q) ;
23 return pkCPA := pk, skCPA := sk ;
Algorithm 12: Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen
CPA-secure Kyber encryption is described in Algorithm 13 where the computation
of ~AT~r + ~e1 can be realised in the same way as the key generation procedure by packing
each polynomial of ~r into ~R only once and with on-the-fly generation of polynomials of
~A to save stack memory. The only difference is that we initialise Uˆtmp with on-the-fly
sampled and packed error polynomials ei ∈ ~e1 before computing the k scalar products.
For
〈
~t, ~r
〉
+ e2 + d q2c ·m we sample e2 by e← CBD(PRF(σ,N)), set Vˆ ← Snort(e+ m¯)
and then compute the scalar product in a loop with Vˆ ←MulAddSingle(Ri, Ttpm, Vˆ ).
All in all, Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc requires k2 + 3k + 1 calls to Snort, k2 + k big integer
multiplications by MulAddSingle and k + 1 calls to Sneeze as well as FinalEll.
In Algorithm 14 we describe CPA-secure Kyber decryption. The implementation of
the scalar product to compute 〈~s, ~u〉 follows the approach from encryption. To reuse
MulAddSingle and to save code needed for a subtraction gadget we first negate v by
computing Vˆ ← Snort(−v) and then negate the final result again as Compressq(−v, 1)
to obtain v − 〈~s, ~u〉. We need 2k + 1 calls of Snort, k big integer multiplications by
MulAddSingle and one call to Sneeze as well as FinalEll.
5.2 Implementation of Kyber on SLE 78
We now give details of our implementation of CPA and CCA-secure Kyber768 (thus k = 3)
on the SLE 78 that are independent of the chosen approach for packing and big integer
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Input: m ∈M
Input: pkCPA
1 ~t, ρ← Decodedt(pkCPA) ;
2 ~t← Decompressq(~t) ;
3 N ← 0 ;
// Sample MLWE secret ~r and transform to ~R
4 for i = k − 1, k − 2, . . . , 0 do
5 rtmp ← CBD(PRF(σ,N)) ;
6 N ← N + 1 ;
7 Ri ← Snort(rtmp) ;
8 end
// Compute ~AT~r + ~e1
9 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 do
10 e← CBD(PRF(σ,N)) ;
11 Uˆtmp ← Snort(e) ;
12 N ← N + 1 ;
13 for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 do
14 atmp ← Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) ;
15 Atmp ← Snort(atmp) ;
16 Uˆtmp ←MulAddSingle(Atmp, Rj , Uˆtmp) ;
17 end
18 Utmp ← FinalEll(Uˆtmp) ;
19 ui ← Sneeze(Utmp) ;
20 end
// Compute
〈
~t, ~r
〉
+ e2
21 m¯← EncodeMsg(m) ;
22 e← CBD(PRF(σ,N)) ;
23 e← e+ m¯ ;
24 Vˆ ← Snort(e) ;
25 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 do
26 Ttpm ← Snort(ti) ;
27 Vˆ ←MulAddSingle(Ri, Ttpm, Vˆ ) ;
28 end
29 V ← FinalEll(Vˆ ) ;
30 v ← Sneeze(V ) ;
// Encode ciphertext
31 c1 ← Encodedu(Compressq(~u, du)) ;
32 c2 ← Encodedv (Compressq(v, dv)) ;
33 return c := (c1||c2) ;
Algorithm 13: Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc
multiplication (see Section 5.3 and Section 5.4). All our implementations are not fully
compatible with the specification as Kyber is explicitly defined with a specific NTT and
assumes that the pseudorandom polynomials of ~A are already output by the sampler in
the NTT domain.
To expand randomness into a longer bitstream, Kyber originally specifies the use of
various instances from the SHA3 family as PRNG (originally, XOF is SHAKE-128 and
PRF is SHAKE-256). We implemented one version of the samplers that is compatible with
the specification where SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 are realised in software. Hardware
acceleration is not possible as our target device does not have a SHA3 hardware accelerator.
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Input: c := (c1||c2)
Input: skCPA
1 ~s← Decode13(skCPA) ;
2 ~u← Decompressq(Decodedu(c1)) ;
3 v ← Decompressq(Decodedv (c2)) ;
4 Vˆ ← Snort(−v) ;
// Compute v − 〈~s, ~u〉
5 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 do
6 Utmp ← Snort(ui) ;
7 Stmp ← Snort(si) ;
8 Vˆ ←MulAddSingle(Stmp, Utmp, Vˆ ) ;
9 end
10 V ← FinalEll(Vˆ ) ;
11 v ← Sneeze(V ) ;
12 return Encode1(Compressq(−v, 1)) ;
Algorithm 14: Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec
The SHA3 implementation written in C has been optimised to some extent with assembly to
remove obvious performance bottlenecks introduced by the compiler. Additionally, we have
implemented a (non-compatible) Kyber variant that is using AES-256 in counter mode to
implement XOF and PRF. A similar approach has been used by Google in their NewHope
experiment where the constant polynomial a was also sampled using AES [Lan16]. Even
though there are some theoretical concerns [ADPS16], this approach appears to be secure
in practice. When AES-256 is chosen as PRNG we can rely on the AES co-processor of
the SLE78CLUFX5000 and do not need to implement AES in software.
A difference that is not noticeable by a user is that we, as previously mentioned, do
not hash the randomness provided to key generation due to the availability of a TRNG.
The hashing of the input randomness in the Kyber specification is intended as a protection
against leakage of the internal state of a random number generator. However, on our
target device we have access to a certified RNG with appropriate post-processing and thus
expensive computation of SHA3-512 is unnecessary.
The implementations of CBD, Parse, Encode, Decode and Decompressq follow
the C reference implementation and are not particularly optimised using assembly. Our
implementation of CCA-secure Kyber using the FO transformation is denoted as Ky-
ber.CCA.Imp.Gen for key generation, Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc for encapsulation and
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec for decapsulation and we straightforwardly follow Algorithm 4 to 6.
The main additional operations demanded by the CCA conversion are the computation
of hash functions to implement random oracles. In one version of our implementation
we follow the specification where H is using SHA3-256 and G is using SHA3-512 and
where SHA3 is implemented in software. Additionally, we implemented a variant where H
is realised by the MAC-based scheme HKDF [Kra10] using a SHA-256 co-processor and
where H is realised by a call to SHA-256. The usage of HKDF is necessary as the output
of G has to be longer than a single SHA-256 hash.
5.3 Realisation of KyberMulAdd with KS1
The KyberMulAdd gadget consists of the functions Snort, MulAddSingle, FinalEll,
and Sneeze. In case of KS1 (standard Kronecker substitution) parameters (ω,m) = (64, 4)
can be used (see Algorithm 11). Then 64 coefficients can be packed into one integer
and it is possible to perform polynomial arithmetic modulo x4 + 1. When aiming for
minimal size we could have used 25 bits of precision per coefficient and thus 64 · 25 = 1600
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bits in total. However, to simplify the packing algorithm we have chosen 32 bits per
coefficient (thus ` = 32) which leads to integers of 64 · 32 = 2048 bits. This way no shifts
by arbitrary integers are required as everything is immediately word aligned in Snort.
This provides a performance advantage as the SLE 78 needs one cycle for each shift to the
right or left. Moreover, the big integer multiplier is relatively fast and thus the tradeoff
between simpler packing/unpacking and slightly larger integer coefficients turned out to
be favorable. However, on different platforms this may not be the case. An issue that
costs some performance is the correct handling of carry bits caused by negative coefficients
in Snort.
For a single big integer multiplication in MulAddSingle we use the RSA co-processor
on the SLE78CLUFX5000 which has five registers of length slightly larger than 2048-bit.
In a simplified model it is able to compute additions of two registers in 8 cycles while
a multiplication with modular reduction takes roughly 9,300 cycles. However, not all
registers are general purpose. One register is a working register that contains the result of
a computation and is not directly accessible from the CPU. Another register is needed
to store the modulus when performing operations modulo p. Thus three registers are
available for temporary results or operands. Naturally, for an integer multiplication modulo
log2 p = 2048, two registers are already occupied with operands.
For KS1 with parameters (ω,m) = (64, 4) and ` = 32 one option to realise the
polynomial multiplication Cˆ(x)← A(x) ·B(x) mod(+) F for A,B,C ∈ Zp with p = F =
2ω` + 1 = 22048 + 1 described in line 8 of Algorithm 11 would be schoolbook multiplication.
As we have to do polynomial arithmetic modulo x4 + 1 this would lead to 42 = 16
multiplications in Zp due to the quadratic complexity of schoolbook multiplication. To
reduce the number of multiplications we have chosen Karatsuba multiplication for our
KS1 implementation of the MulAddSingle function, which leads to 9 multiplications,
17 additions and 16 subtractions in Zp. These numbers include additions or subtractions
required for the modulo x4 + 1 operation. In general, Karatsuba multiplication leads
to a large number of additions as a trade-off for fewer multiplications. An approach
where the additions are executed on the RSA co-processor would be possible but requires
a lot of transfers. We thus decided to exploit the ability to run the co-processor and
the CPU in parallel. While the RSA co-processor executes a modular multiplication
we compute long integer additions in parallel on the CPU. This can easily be achieved
by the appropriate rearrangement of multiplication and addition/subtraction operations
in the Karatsuba formula. For simplicity, we give a sort example for a(x) = a0 + a1 x
and b(x) = b0 + b1 x. A polynomial multiplication can be computed with Karatsuba as
a(x)b(x) = a0b0 + ((a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)− a1b1 − a0b0)x+ a1b1 x2. Here some additions can
be performed in parallel to multiplications where T1 = a1 · b1 and T2 = b1 + b0 is computed
in parallel, then T3 = a0 · b0 and T4 = a1 + a0, then T5 = T2 · T4 and T6 = T1 + T3. Final
additions and computations are T7 = x2 · T1, T8 = T5 − T6, T9 = x · T8, T10 = T7 + T9,
and T11 = T3 + T10 where a(x)b(x) = T11. Note in our specific case also some additions or
subtractions caused by the modulo x4 + 1 operation are also hidden behind multiplications.
For the remaining additions and subtractions we make use of the co-processor. To save
cycles for transfers we store the result of several additions/subtractions in one register of
the co-processor so that we only have to transfer values into the co-processor and then
read out the final result. The FinalEll function (see line 10 of Algorithm 11) requires 3
multiplications by 2`. They are implemented on the co-processor using a special command
that allows fast shifting by 32 bits and are thus relatively cheap.
5.4 Realisation of KyberMulAdd with KS2
The KyberMulAdd gadget can also be implemented for KS2 (compact Kronecker) with
parameters (ω,m) = (128, 2). Compact Kronecker would allow to pack 128 coefficients
into two big integers with 13 bits per coefficients. With 13 bits of precision per coefficient
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13 · 128 = 1664 bits would be required in total. However, similarly to KS1 we use 16
bits for easier packing/unpacking and end up with integers of size of 16 · 128 = 2048 bits
(` = 16). Computations are then performed on two polynomials modulo x2 + 1. This leads
to 2 ·22 = 8 multiplications in Zp for p = F = 2ω`+1 when using schoolbook multiplication.
With Karatsuba a reduction to 2 · 3 = 6 multiplication would be possible. As the difference
between Karatsuba and schoolbook is small we use schoolbook multiplication to implement
KS2. This allows us to store partial products during schoolbook multiplication in the
free register of the RSA co-processor. This way we can perform additions with the RSA
co-processor and save time as we do not have to retrieve every result from the co-processor
into the memory.
5.5 Realisation of MulAdd for other RLWE-based schemes
In a similar fashion to Sections 5.3 and 5.4, one could choose to implement MulAdd
for RLWE-based schemes working with polynomials of higher degree. For example,
NewHope [AAB+17] proposes the following set of parameters (NewHope512) targetting
Category 1 security [Nat16]: n = 512, q = 12289, η = 8, f = xn + 1. Lemma 1 suggests
using ` = 26 (resp. ` = 13) bits of precision per coefficient for use with KS1 (resp. KS2).
To further improve packing and unpacking performance, we consider ` = 32 (resp. ` = 16),
which results in parameters (ω,m) = (64, 8) with 32 · 64 = 2048 bits per polynomial
coefficient (resp. (ω,m) = (128, 4) with 16 · 128 = 2048 bits per polynomial coefficient),
assuming our integer multiplier supports inputs of length 2048 + 1 bits. Schoolbook
multiplication would then requrie 82 = 64 (resp. 2 · 42 = 32) multiplications in Zp for
p = F = 2ω` + 1, while recursively applying Karatsuba would result in 3log2 8 = 27 (resp.
2 ·3log2 4 = 18) multiplications. While this procedure gives us a rough estimate of the cost of
implementing NewHope512 using different strategies, it does not take into account concrete
implementation issues such as the size and number of registers available in the CPU, the
number of additions required, or the possible speedups from running light operations on
the CPU while waiting for the modular multiplier to return a result for each multiplication.
6 Performance and comparison
In this section we describe the performance of our Kyber768 implementation on the SLE
78 and compare our results to related work. All cycle counts are averages of several runs
and have been measured on a cycle accurate FPGA-based emulator.
6.1 Implementation performance
In Table 2 we provide cycle counts of our implementation of Kyber768, its variants, and
selected sub-functions. The results show similar performance for the KS1 and KS2 approach
in Kyber.CPA.Imp with a small advantage for KS2. The explanation is that KS1 with
Karatsuba requires only a single multiplication more than KS2 with schoolbook. The
additional additions necessary for Karatsuba in KS1 can effectively be hidden by running
them in parallel with the RSA co-processor and Snort for KS1 is roughly twice as fast than
for KS2. However, this is only a conclusion for the particular parameters using the specific
co-processor. KS1 and KS2 might lead to very different results in case our approach would
be used to implement a scheme like NewHope where n is much larger than in Kyber. Cycle
counts for CBD and Parse show that usage of the AES co-processor provides a significant
speedup compared to the SHA3 software implementation. For CBD the difference is a
factor of 300 and for Parse even a factor of 945. With more optimization of the SHA3
software, e.g. by writing it fully in assembly, it might be possible to reduce this to some
extent. An additional advantage is that the AES co-processor already implements some
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countermeasures against physical attacks. Such attacks are not the focus of our work but
a secured PRNG would be easier to realise with the AES co-processor than by using a
shared SW implementation of SHA3 (see [OSPG18] where this necessity is discussed and
performance of a shared SHA3 is given). With roughly ≈ 376, 000 cycles used for sampling
in Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (≈ 9×Parse+ 6×CBD) and roughly ≈ 407, 000 cycles used
in Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (≈ 9 × Parse + 7 ×CBD) the sampling requires only about
10 percent of the overall runtime. Additionally, in Table 3 we have computed the sum
of cycles based on the calls to measured subfunctions for KS1. This gives an overview
what amount of cycles can be associated to each operation. In all three functions the most
cycles are contributed by MulAddSingle and Sneeze. They would be a natural target
for further optimization.
Compared to a Kyber768 implementation that is using the NTT as specified in [SAB+17]
on the SLE 78 in software, our approach of using the co-processor to compute the
KyberMulAdd gadget provides an advantage. On the SLE 78 a single n = 256 NTT
costs 997,691 cycles. The computation of KyberCPA.Enc for k = 3 requires 10 calls to
the NTT9 which alone would account for roughly 10 · 997,691 ≈ 10.0 million cycles plus
additional overhead from pointwise multiplication and addition.
In case one would want to make our implementation compatible with Kyber as specified
in [SAB+17] in terms of NTT usage and still use the KyberMulAdd gadget we would
have to perform k2 inverse NTTs and then use our multiplication algorithm. This would
add roughly 32 · 997,691 ≈ 9.0 million cycles to Gen and Enc when executed on the CPU.
It would basically nullify all gains from a different and faster algorithm for polynomial
multiplication.
All in all, when our Kyber variant that is using the AES co-processor (i.e. AES-HW)
is run on our target device with an average clock frequency of 50 MHz we can execute Ky-
ber.CPA.Imp.Gen in 72.5 ms, Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc in 94.9 and Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec
in 28.4 ms.
For the CCA variant the decryption becomes slower due to the re-encryption but the
additional overhead of the hash functions H and G is rather low when the SHA-256 co-
processor is used (HW-SHA-256) to compute SHA-256 and HKDF with HMAC-SHA-256.
When H and G are instantiated with SHA3 implemented in software (SW-SHA3) a signifi-
cant portion of the computation is now attributed to SHA3. In comparison we can execute
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen in 79.6 ms (2,903 ms with SW-SHA3), Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc
in 102.4 ms (571.2 ms with SW-SHA3) and Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec in 132.7 ms (394.0
ms with SW-SHA3). An implementation of Kyber that is fully compatible with the
specification [SAB+17] would not achieve practical performance mainly due to the slow
SHA3 PRNG performance and to a lesser extent due to the slower NTT in software. Of
course, further low-level optimization of SHA3 and the NTT could change this picture to
some extent.
6.2 Comparison with related work
In Table 4 we provide a comparison of our results with related work on similar target
platforms. However, it should be noted that such a comparison will always lack precision
as many parameters of published implementations differ in terms of cryptographic (post-
quantum) bit-security level, implementation security level, exact variant of a scheme, CPU
architecture, maximum clock frequency of the device, or availability of specific accelerators.
Moreover, only limited information is available about most smart card platforms and those
platforms are often not available without signing non-disclosure agreements. It is also
clear that the requirements for a certified contactless high security controller, where most
9See [SAB+17, Algorithm 5] where 3 NTTs are required to transform ~r, 3 inverse NTTs are applied to
~ˆ
A ◦ ~ˆr, 3 inverse NTTs are needed to transform ~t and 1 inverse NTT is then needed to obtain v.
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Table 2: Performance of our work on the SLE 78 target device in clock cycles.
Operation Cycles
Snort (KS1) 31,017
Sneeze (KS1) 295,730
MulAddSingle (KS1) 201,767
FinalEll (KS1) 28,381
Snort (KS2) 70,015
Sneeze (KS2) 295,331
MulAddSingle (KS2) 186,652
FinalEll (KS2) 90,728
NTT (n = 256, in SW) 997,691
Pointwise-Multiplication (n = 256, in SW) 356,549
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (Software-SHA3) 9,341,406
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (Hardware-AES) 31,068
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (Software-SHA3) 19,934,170
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (Hardware-AES) 21,081
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS1) 3,953,224
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS1) 5,385,598
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS1) 1,382,963
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS2) 3,625,718
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; KS2) 4,747,291
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS2) 1,420,367
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; HW-SHA-256: H; KS2) 3,980,517
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; HW-SHA-256: G,H; KS2) 5,117,996
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; HW-SHA-256: G,H; KS2) 6,632,704
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Gen (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; SW-SHA3: H; KS2) 14,512,691
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Enc (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; SW-SHA3: G,H; KS2) 18,051,747
Kyber.CCA.Imp.Dec (HW-AES: PRF/XOF; SW-SHA3: G,H; KS2) 19,702,139
computations are done using co-processors, are expected to lead to different CPU designs
or low-level implementations than that for a high performance embedded microcontroller.
As we use an RSA co-processor for lattice-based cryptography, a natural target for
a comparison is RSA. The cycle counts given in Table 4 for co-processor supported
RSA on our SLE 78 target device are based on the data sheet. With an average clock
frequency of 50 MHz on the SLE 78, RSA encryption can be executed in 6 ms while RSA
decryption with CRT needs 120 ms. In comparison with our work this shows that our
Kyber implementation is two orders of magnitude slower for encryption but performs
decryption with similar speed. In case RSA is not used with CRT our Kyber decryption
even outperforms RSA. However, it should be noted that the RSA cycle counts do not
account for padding like Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) which is often
used to achieve CCA2 security for RSA. However, they include countermeasures against
physical attacks (e.g. exponent blinding or message blinding, see [FWA+13]) while our
implementation does not.
Publicly available information on the performance of RSA and ECC on various smart
cards running the JavaCard platform can be found in works like [DRHM17, SNS+16], the
Bachelor’s thesis of Kvašňovský [Kva16] as well as in the JCAlgTest project10. Across
the selected cards, the runtime for an RSA2048 encryption function call is in the range
from 8 to 74 ms while RSA2048 decryption takes between 426 to 2,927 ms and 140 to
1,569 ms when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). On-card key generation
10See https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/jcalgtest/comparative-table.html.
23
Table 3: Called functions, number of calls, clock cycles, and final sum of clock cycles.
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (KS1)
Function Calls Cycles per function Product
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) 6 31,068 186,408
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) 9 21,081 189,729
Snort 15 31,017 465,255
MulAddSingle 9 201,767 1,815,903
Sneeze 3 295,730 887,190
FinalEll 3 28,381 85,143
Encode/Decode - - 400,226
= 4,029,854
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (KS1)
Function Calls Cycles per function Product
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) 7 31,068 217,476
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) 9 21,081 189,729
Snort 19 31,017 589,515
MulAddSingle 12 201,767 2,421,204
Sneeze 4 295,730 1,182,920
FinalEll 4 28,381 113,524
Encode/Decode - - 676,453
= 5,390,629
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS1)
Function Calls Cycles per function Product
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) 0 31,068 0
Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) 0 21,081 0
Snort 4 31,017 217,119
MulAddSingle 3 201,767 605,301
Sneeze 1 295,730 295,730
FinalEll 1 28,381 28,381
Encode/Decode - 365,175
= 1,511,706
0 2 4
·106
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Gen (KS1)
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Enc (KS1)
Kyber.CPA.Imp.Dec (KS1)
Cycles
CBD(PRF(σ,N)) (HW-AES) Parse(XOF(ρ||i||j)) (HW-AES) Snort
MulAddSingle Sneeze FinalEll
Encode/Decode
Figure 1: Total cycle counts per function from Table 3.
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for RSA2048 is a complex process with a variable runtime due to the required primality
testing and takes between 6,789 and 44,143 ms. There is also a certain overhead by the
JavaCard platform compared to a pure native implementation as well as overhead from
various countermeasures against physical attacks.
For comparison with other post-quantum schemes we have ported the reference im-
plementation of ephemeral/CPA-secure NewHope with n = 1024 claiming 255-bits of
post-quantum security onto our target device. To obtain a fair comparison we also changed
the internal PRNG to use the co-processor-based AES in counter-mode and we removed
costly randomness hashing in the key generation. With these modifications the main bot-
tleneck in NewHope is the computation of NTTs. When comparing CPA-secure NewHope
implementation (claimed 255-bit security level) with our CPA-secure Kyber (claimed
161-bit security level) in an ephemeral key setting11, we achieve a factor of 6 better
performance for Alice (Gen+Dec) and a factor of 7 better performance for Bob (Enc).
Note that the implementation of our variant of Kyber that is not using the NTT would
most likely lead a loss of performance on other platforms. However, the implementation of
Saber on ARM given in [KMRV18] shows that high performance is also possible without
using the NTT when parameters are chosen accordingly.
Most modern general purpose ARM-based microcontroller platforms (e.g. Cortex-M)
have the advantage of a 32-bit architecture and are equipped with a single-cycle or few-cycle
multiplier (optional in Cortex-M0). Thus good performance can be expected for most
arithmetic operations, e.g. the inner loop of the NTT. Open-source implementations of
Kyber768 and NewHope1024 targeting general purpose ARM controllers are available
through the mupq project [va18]. It can be seen that in comparison with such a different
class of devices our CCA-secure Kyber768 implementation of Gen and Enc is slower than
CCA-secure Kyber768 on ARM using the NTT.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this work we have shown that fast post-quantum cryptography is feasible on current
smart card platforms. On a commercially available device it is possible to obtain a
significant speedup of the arithmetic of lattice-based cryptography by reusing already
existing co-processors dedicated to the acceleration of RSA or ECC. Our work can thus be
used by the industry for a possibly smoother migration towards PQC, by reusing already
existing and available hardware. Our work also shows that the NTT might not always
be the superior polynomial multiplication algorithm.12 This seems to be a worthwhile
consideration in the context of the NIST standardisation process where some schemes
made the NTT part of their definition. Moreover, our results show that the performance
of lattice-based schemes on particular embedded devices highly depends on the speed
of the underlying PRNG. It might be worthwhile to consider constructions that make
use of PRNGs based on AES instead of SHA3 due to the better availability of (secured)
AES hardware acceleration on smart cards or constrained devices in general. The same
argument applies to the instantiation of hash functions using SHA-256.
With regard to the optimisation of our particular Kyber implementation, a possible
next step is an implementation on an ARM-based smart card or embedded secure element
equipped with an ECC/RSA co-processor. On such an architecture the comparison
to standard microcontroller-based implementations of PQC (e.g. [vMOG15, DHH+15,
OSPG18]) would be much easier. Additionally, it is an open question how much speedup
ECC/RSA co-processors will actually provide on ARM platforms equipped with a single-
11Of course, a better target for comparison would be Kyber1024 with 218-bit security but an implemen-
tation on SLE 78 is not available as we focus on Kyber768.
12See also an NTT-related discussion on the NIST PQC mailing list: https://groups.google.com/a/
list.nist.gov/forum/#!topic/pqc-forum/r9R7OJT6x_c.
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Table 4: Comparison of our work with other PKE or KEM schemes on various microcon-
troller platforms in clock cycles.
Scheme Target Gen Enc Dec
Kyber768a (CPA; our work) SLE 78 3,625,718 4,747,291 1,420,367
Kyber768b (CCA; our work) SLE 78 3,980,517 5,117,996 6,632,704
RSA-2048c SLE 78 - ≈ 300,000 ≈ 21,200,000
RSA-2048 (CRT)d SLE 78 - ≈ 300,000 ≈ 6,000,000
Kyber768 (CPA+NTT)e SLE 78 ≈ 10,000,000 ≈ 14,600,000 ≈ 5,400,000
NewHope1024f SLE 78 ≈ 14,700,000 ≈ 31,800,000 ≈ 15,200,000
Kyber768g ARM 1,200,351 1,497,789 1,526,564
NewHope-1024h ARM 1,168,224 1,738,922 298,877
CPA-RLWE-512i AVR - 1,975,806 553,536
CCA-RLWE-1024j ARM 2,669,559 4,176,68 4,416,918
Saberk ARM 1,147,000 1,444,000 1,543,000
QC-MDPCl ARM - 7,018,493 42,129,589
Curve25519m MSP 5,941,784 11,883,568 5,941,784
Curve25519n ARM 3,589,850 7,179,700 3,589,850
a CPA-secure Kyber variant using the AES co-processor to implement PRF/XOF and KS2 on SLE 78
@ 50 MHz.
b CCA-secure Kyber variant using the AES co-processor to implement PRF/XOF, the SHA-256
co-processor to implement G and H and KS2 on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz.
c RSA-2048 encryption with short exponent and decryption without CRT and with countermeasures
on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz. Extrapoliation based on data-sheet.
d RSA-2048 decryption with short exponent and decryption with CRT and countermeasures on SLE
78 @ 50 MHz. Extrapoliation based on data-sheet.
e Extrapolation of cycle counts of CPA-secure Kyber768 based on our implementation assuming usage
of the AES co-processor to implement PRF/XOF and a software implementation of the NTT with
997,691 cycles for an NTT on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz.
f Reference implementation of constant time ephemeral NewHope key exchange (n = 1024) [ADPS16]
modified to use the AES co-processor as PRNG on SLE 78 @ 50 MHz.
g Kyber768 from mupq project [va18] on ARM Cortex-M4F (STM32).
h Constant time ephemeral NewHope key exchange (n=1024) [ADPS16] from [AJS16] on ARM
Cortex-M0 (STM32) @ 48 MHz.
i Constant time CPA-secure RLWE-encryption [LP11] (RLWEenc-IIa with n = 512) from [LPO+17b]
on 8-bit ATxmega128A1 @ 32 MHz.
j CCA-secure RLWE-encryption [LP11] (n = 1024) from [OSPG18] on ARM Cortex-M4F (STM32) @
168 MHz. With first order masking decryption is 25,334,493 cycles.
k Saber [DKRV17] from [KMRV18] on ARM Cortex-M4F (STM32F4) @ 168 MHz. Parameters
provide 180-bit of quantum-security.
l CPA-secure QC-MPDC public-key encryption [MTSB12] from [vMOG15] on ARM Cortex-M4F
(STM32F407) @ 168 MHz. Parameters provide 80-bit pre-quantum security level.
m Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman using Curve25519 [Ber06] from [DHH+15] on 16-bit MSP430X @ 16
MHz. For simplification we report the cost of one point multiplication (PM) in Gen, two PMs in Enc
and one PM in Dec.
n Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman using Curve25519 [Ber06] from [DHH+15] on ARM Cortex @ 48 MHz.
Reporting as in l .
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cycle multiplier. Here it is also worth to consider that on an ARM processor Snort,
Sneeze, and software-based big integer addition are also expected to be significantly faster
due to the more efficient instruction set and larger word size, while the CPU and the
co-processor could still execute in parallel.
From the algorithmic side, in the case of the KS1, ω = 64 implementation of Kyber we
currently require ` ≥ 25 bits of precision, and hence opted for using 32 bits. By using the
considerations made in Section 4 about swapping ω for n in the formula for computing `,
we could get down to ` ≥ 23, making it possible to save some memory at the cost of a
more complex unpacking.
In a more general direction it appears interesting to investigate whether a performance
advantage can be obtained with schemes specifically designed with the constraints of the
big integer multiplier in mind such as ThreeBears [Ham17] or Mersenne-75683917 [AJPS17].
However, we note that these schemes use integer sizes too large for direct handling with
our co-processor. In contrast, MLWE-based schemes immediately allow for a piece-wise
approach. Thus, another interesting target for implementation could be an MLWE-based
scheme that is parameterised with a power-of-two modulus q, e.g. SABER [DKRV17] which
permits to efficiently implement the strategy from Equation (1). For example, a viable
choice could be a prime-cyclotomic ring for n = 167 with 213 such that each ring element
fits directly into a co-processor register. Another approach would be a Kyber instantiation
with a smaller prime modulus q, as we do not have to choose q in a way that a fast NTT
exists. Moreover, our results naturally transfer over to the Dilithium signature scheme
and an implementation on the SLE 78 is a natural next step. However, parameters have
to be adapted for Dilithium, as it uses a larger modulus q = 8380417. Another interesting
question is whether it is possible to efficiently use RSA/ECC co-processors to implement
the NTT by treating the big integer multiplier as a vector processor using smart packing
of coefficients or a variant of Kronecker substitution.
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A Cyclotomic gadgets
In this Appendix we prove Corollaries 1 and 2.
of Corollary 1. We need to verify that
f(2`) > 2n` − 1 (5)
and that
di ∈ {−δ, . . . , δ} (6)
Condition 5 holds since f(2`) = 2n` + 1. Condition 6 follows by explicitly evaluating
d(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
di x
i := a(x) · b(x) + c(x) (mod xn + 1)
which implies that
di =
∑
[j+k]n= i
−1Jj+k≥nK aj bk + ci
and hence
max
{aj}j ,{bk}k,
{cm}m
|di| ≤ nαβ + γ =: δ.
Lemma 2. Let a =
∑n−1
i=0 ai x
i, b =
∑n−1
i=0 bi x
i with ai, bi ∈ Z, and let f =
∑n
i=0 x
i. Let
ci :=
∑
j+k=i ajbk such that c :=
∑2n−2
i=0 ci x
i = a · b and let d := ∑n−1i=0 di xi ≡ c (mod f).
Then
d =
n−3∑
i=0
(ci − cn + ci+n+1)xi + (cn−2 − cn)xn−2 + (cn−1 − cn)xn−1
and each di is a sum of at most 2n− 1 terms of the form ajbk.
Proof. Let f (m) :=
∑m
i=0 x
i (it follows that f ≡ f (n)). Since a and b have degree < n, we
know that we need to reduce modulo f only the powers xi+n for i = 0, . . . , n− 2 of c. For
i ≥ 1 we have
xi+n ≡ xi(xn − f (n)(x)) (mod f)
= −xi(f (n−1))
= −xi−1(xf (n−1))
= −xi−1(f (n) − 1)
≡ xi−1 (mod f),
while for i = 0, xn ≡ −f (n−1) (mod f). Hence, we can write
c =
2n−2∑
i=0
ci x
i
=
n−1∑
i=0
ci x
i + cn xn +
n−3∑
i=0
cn+i+1 x
n+i+1
≡
n−1∑
i=0
ci x
i − cn
n−1∑
i=0
xi +
n−3∑
i=0
cn+i+1 x
i (mod f)
≡
n−3∑
i=0
(ci − cn + cn+i+1)xi + (cn−2 − cn)xn−2 + (cn−1 − cn)xn−1 (mod f)
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where each ci is a sum of #{(j, k) ∈ [0, n− 1]2 ∩ Z2 | j + k = i} = n− |i− n+ 1| terms
ajbk.
Hence,
d =
n−3∑
i=0
(ci − cn + cn+i+1)xi + (cn−2 − cn)xn−2 + (cn−1 − cn)xn−1
where by explicit computation dn−1 is a sum of 2n−1 terms ajbk, dn−2 is a sum of 2n−2 such
terms and, for i ≤ n−3, di has 3n−|i− n+ 1|− |n− n+ 1|− |n+ i+ 1− n+ 1| = 2n−2
such terms.
of Corollary 2. We need to verify that
f(2`) > 2n` − 1 (7)
and that
di ∈ {−δ, . . . , δ} (8)
Condition 7 holds since f(2`) = 2n` + 2(n−1)` + · · ·+ 1. Condition 8 follows by explicitly
evaluating
d =
n−1∑
i=0
di x
i ≡ a · b+ c (mod f)
using Lemma 2, which implies that
max
{aj}j ,{bk}k,
{cm}m
|di| ≤ (2n− 1)αβ + γ =: δ.
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B Proof of Concept
Our high-level proof-of-concept implementation is written in SageMath [S+17].
# -*- coding: utf -8 -*-
"""
Kyber using big integer arithmetic - proof -of-concept
.. note :: Run tests as ‘‘sage -t test.py‘‘
"""
from sage.all import parent , ZZ, vector , PolynomialRing , GF
from sage.all import log , ceil , randint , set_random_seed , random_vector , matrix , floor
def BinomialDistribution(eta):
r = 0
for i in range(eta):
r += randint(0, 1) - randint(0, 1)
return r
def balance(e, q=None):
"""
Return a representation of ‘e‘ with elements balanced between ‘-q/2‘ and ‘q/2‘
:param e: a vector , polynomial or scalar
:param q: optional modulus , if not present this function tries to recover it from ‘e‘
:returns: a vector , polynomial or scalar over/in the integers
"""
try:
p = parent(e). change_ring(ZZ)
return p([ balance(e_ , q=q) for e_ in e])
except (TypeError , AttributeError ):
if q is None:
try:
q = parent(e).order()
except AttributeError:
q = parent(e). base_ring (). order ()
e = ZZ(e)
e = e % q
return ZZ(e-q) if e>q//2 else ZZ(e)
# Kyber (sort of)
class Kyber:
n = 256
q = 7681
eta = 4
k = 3
D = staticmethod(BinomialDistribution)
f = [1]+[0]*(n -1)+[1]
ce = n
@classmethod
def key_gen(cls , seed=None):
""" Generate a new public/secret key pair
:param cls: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param seed: seed used for random sampling if provided
.. note :: Resembles Algorithm 1 of the Kyber paper.
"""
n, q, eta , k, D = cls.n, cls.q, cls.eta , cls.k, cls.D
if seed is not None:
set_random_seed(seed)
R, x = PolynomialRing(ZZ , "x"). objgen ()
Rq = PolynomialRing(GF(q), "x")
f = R(cls.f)
A = matrix(Rq, k, k, [Rq.random_element(degree=n-1) for _ in range(k*k)])
s = vector(R, k, [R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)]) for _ in range(k)])
e = vector(R, k, [R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)]) for _ in range(k)])
t = (A*s + e) % f # NOTE ignoring compression
return (A, t), s
@classmethod
def enc(cls , pk, m=None , seed=None):
"""IND -CPA encryption sans compression
:param cls: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param pk: public key
:param m: optional message , otherwise all zero string is encrypted
:param seed: seed used for random sampling if provided
.. note :: Resembles Algorithm 2 of the Kyber paper.
"""
n, q, eta , k, D = cls.n, cls.q, cls.eta , cls.k, cls.D
if seed is not None:
set_random_seed(seed)
A, t = pk
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R, x = PolynomialRing(ZZ , "x"). objgen ()
f = R(cls.f)
r = vector(R, k, [R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)]) for _ in range(k)])
e1 = vector(R, k, [R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)]) for _ in range(k)])
e2 = R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)])
if m is None:
m = (0,)
u = (r*A + e1) % f # NOTE ignoring compression
u.set_immutable ()
v = (r*t + e2 + q//2 * R(list(m))) % f # NOTE ignoring compression
return u, v
@classmethod
def dec(cls , sk, c, decode=True ):
"""IND -CPA decryption
:param cls: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param sk: secret key
:param c: ciphertext
:param decode: perform final decoding
.. note :: Resembles Algorithm 3 of the Kyber paper.
"""
n, q = cls.n, cls.q
s = sk
u, v = c
R, x = PolynomialRing(ZZ , "x"). objgen ()
f = R(cls.f)
m = (v - s*u) % f
m = list(m)
while len(m) < n:
m.append (0)
m = balance(vector(m), q)
if decode:
return cls.decode(m, q, n)
else:
return m
@staticmethod
def decode(m, q, n):
""" Decode vector ‘m‘ to ‘\{0,1\}^n‘ depending on distance to ‘q/2‘
:param m: a vector of length ‘\leq n‘
:param q: modulus
"""
return vector(GF(2), n, [abs(e)>q/ZZ(4) for e in m] + [0 for _ in range(n-len(m))])
@classmethod
def encap(cls , pk , seed=None):
"""IND -CCA encapsulation sans compression or extra hash
:param cls: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param pk: public key
:param seed: seed used for random sampling if provided
.. note :: Resembles Algorithm 4 of the Kyber paper.
"""
n = cls.n
if seed is not None:
set_random_seed(seed)
m = random_vector(GF(2), n)
m.set_immutable ()
set_random_seed(hash(m)) # NOTE: this is obviously not faithful
K_ = random_vector(GF(2), n)
K_.set_immutable ()
r = ZZ.random_element (0, 2**n-1)
c = cls.enc(pk, m, r)
K = hash ((K_, c)) # NOTE: this obviously isn’t a cryptographic hash
return c, K
@classmethod
def decap(cls , sk , pk , c):
"""IND -CCA decapsulation
:param cls: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param sk: secret key
:param pk: public key
:param c: ciphertext
.. note :: Resembles Algorithm 5 of the Kyber paper.
"""
n = cls.n
m = cls.dec(sk, c)
m.set_immutable ()
set_random_seed(hash(m)) # NOTE: this is obviously not faithful
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K_ = random_vector(GF(2), n)
K_.set_immutable ()
r = ZZ.random_element (0, 2**n-1)
c_ = cls.enc(pk, m, r)
if c == c_:
return hash ((K_, c)) # NOTE: this obviously isn’t a cryptographic hash
else:
return hash(c) # NOTE ignoring z
class MiniKyber(Kyber):
"""
Tiny parameters for testing.
"""
n = 8
q = 127
eta = 1
k = 1
f = [1]+[0]*(n -1)+[1]
ce = n
class Nose:
"""
Snorting (packing) and sneezing (unpacking ).
"""
@staticmethod
def snort(g, f, p):
"""
Convert vector ‘g‘ in ‘\ZZ^n‘ with coefficients bounded by ‘p/2‘ in absolute value to
integer ‘\bmodp f(p)‘.
:param g: a vector of length ‘n‘
:param f: a minpoly
:param p: base
:returns: an integer mod ‘f(p)‘
"""
return g.change_ring(ZZ)(p) % f(p)
@staticmethod
def sneeze(G, f, p):
""" Convert integer ‘G \bmodl f(p)‘ to vector of integers
:param G: an integer ‘\bmodl f(p)‘
:param f: a minpoly
:param p: base
"""
assert(G >= 0 and G < f(p))
n = f.degree ()
c = 0
r = []
for i in range(n):
e = G % p
G -= e
e += c
G = G//p
c = int(e > p//2)
e -= c*p
r.append(e)
for i in range(n):
r[i] -= f[i]*(G+c)
return r[:n]
@staticmethod
def proof_sneeze(G, f, p):
""" Convert integer ‘G \bmod f(p)‘ to vector of integers
:param G: an integer ‘\bmod f(p)‘
:param f: a minpoly
:param p: base
"""
assert(G >= 0 and G < f(p))
n = f.degree ()
r = []
for i in range(n):
e = G % p
G -= e
G = G//p
if e > p//2:
e -= p
G += 1
r.append(e)
for i in range(n):
r[i] -= f[i]*G
return r[:n]
@classmethod
def prec(cls , scheme ):
"""
Return ‘\log_2(k ce eta (q-1)/2 + (q -1)/2 + 1) + 1‘
1. eta q/2 is the upper bound on the product in absolute value
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2. We add ce such products during modular reduction
3. We add up k such numbers when doing inner products
4. We add a number of size eta in absolute value
5. The modular reduction of the integer multiplier might add +/- max_i(|f_i|) to balance the output
6. One sign bit
"""
eta , q, k, f, ce = scheme.eta , scheme.q, scheme.k, scheme.f, scheme.ce
l = log(k*ce*floor(q/ZZ (2))* eta + eta + max([abs(fi) for fi in f]) + 1, 2) + 1
return l
@classmethod
def muladd(cls , scheme , a, b, c, l=None):
"""
Compute ‘a \cdot b + c mod f‘ using big -integer arithmetic
:param cls: Skipper class
:param scheme: Scheme class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param a: vector of polynomials in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param b: vector of polynomials in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param c: polynomial in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param l: bits of precision
"""
R, x = PolynomialRing(ZZ , "x"). objgen ()
k, f = scheme.k, R(scheme.f)
if l is None:
l = ceil(cls.prec(scheme ))
A = vector(R, k, [cls.snort(a[j], f, 2**l) for j in range(k)])
B = vector(R, k, [cls.snort(b[j], f, 2**l) for j in range(k)])
C = cls.snort(c, f, 2**l)
F = f(2**l)
D = (A*B + C) % F
d = cls.sneeze(D % F, f, 2**l)
return R(d)
# Skipper
class Skipper4(Nose):
"""
Kyber using big integer arithmetic
IND -CPA Decryption in 30 multiplication of (64 \cdot 25 =) 1600-bit integers.
- Degree 4 polynomial multiplication
- Standard signed Kronecker substitution to pack 64 coefficients into one integer.
"""
@staticmethod
def ff(v, offset , start =0):
"""Fast -forward through vector ‘v‘ in ‘‘offset ‘‘ sized steps starting at ‘‘start ‘‘
:param v: vector
:param offset: increment in each step
:param start: start offset
"""
p = parent(v)
return p(list(v)[start :: offset ])
@classmethod # TODO: n vs 2n expansion factor # TODO: tempted of getting rid of this
def prec(cls , kyber):
"""
Return ‘\log_2(k n eta (q-1)/2 + (q -1)/2 + 1) + 1‘
1. eta q/2 is the upper bound on the product in absolute value
2. We add n such products during modular reduction # TODO: n vs 2n
3. We add up k such numbers when doing inner products
4. We add a number of size eta in absolute value
5. The modular reduction of the integer multiplier might add +/- max_i(|f_i|) to balance the output
6. One sign bit
"""
n, eta , q, k, f = kyber.n, kyber.eta , kyber.q, kyber.k, kyber.f
l = log(k*n*floor(q/ZZ (2))* eta + eta + max([abs(fi) for fi in f]) + 1, 2) + 1
return l
@classmethod
def muladd(cls , kyber , a, b, c, l=None):
"""
Compute ‘a \cdot b + c‘ using big -integer arithmetic
:param cls: Skipper class
:param kyber: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param a: vector of polynomials in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param b: vector of polynomials in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param c: polynomial in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param l: bits of precision
"""
m, k = 4, kyber.k
w = kyber.n//m
R, x = PolynomialRing(ZZ , "x"). objgen ()
f = R([1]+[0]*(w -1)+[1])
if l is None:
# Could try passing degree w, but would require more careful
# sneezing
l = ceil(cls.prec(kyber))
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R = PolynomialRing(ZZ, "x")
x = R.gen()
A = vector(R, k, [sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(a[j], m, i), f, 2**l) * x**i
for i in range(m))
for j in range(k)])
C = sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(c, m, i), f, 2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
B = vector(R, k, [sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(b[j], m, i), f, 2**l) * x**i
for i in range(m))
for j in range(k)])
F = f(2**l)
# MUL: k * 3^2 (Karatsuba for length 4)
# % F here is applied to the 64-coeff -packs.
# k comes from len(A) = len(B) = k, each constrains
# a deg 4 poly needing (recursive) karatsuba => 9
W = (A*B + C) % F
# MUL: 3
# specific trick for how we multiply degree n = 256 polys
# the coefficients from above need readjustment
# here doing 2**l * is basically doing y * !!! and if this wraps around
# it takes care of the - in front
W = sum((W[0+i] + (2**l * W[m+i] % F))*x**i for i in range(m-1)) + W[m-1]*x**(m-1)
D = [cls.sneeze(W[i] % F, f, 2**l) for i in range(m)]
d = []
for j in range(w):
for i in range(m):
d.append(D[i][j])
return R(d)
@classmethod
def enc(cls , kyber , pk , m=None , seed=None , l=None):
"""IND -CPA encryption sans compression
:param kyber: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param pk: public key
:param m: optional message , otherwise all zero string is encrypted
:param seed: seed used for random sampling if provided
"""
n, q, eta , k, D = kyber.n, kyber.q, kyber.eta , kyber.k, kyber.D
if seed is not None:
set_random_seed(seed)
A, t = pk
R = PolynomialRing(ZZ, "x")
r = vector(R, k, [R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)]) for _ in range(k)])
e1 = vector(R, k, [R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)]) for _ in range(k)])
e2 = R([(D(eta)) for _ in range(n)])
if m is None:
m = (0,)
u = vector(R, [cls.muladd(kyber , r, A.column(i), e1[i], l=l) for i in range(k)])
u.set_immutable ()
v = cls.muladd(kyber , r, t, e2 + q//2 * R(list(m)), l=l)
return u, v
@classmethod
def dec(cls , kyber , sk , c, l=None , decode=True ):
""" Decryption.
:param kyber: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param sk: secret key
:param c: ciphertext
:param l: bits of precision
:param decode: perform final decoding
"""
n, q = kyber.n, kyber.q
u, v = c
s = sk
m = -cls.muladd(kyber , s, u, -v, l=l)
m = balance(vector(m), q)
if decode:
return kyber.decode(m, q, n)
else:
return m
class Skipper2Negated(Skipper4 ):
"""
Kyber using big integer arithmetic
IND -CPA Kyber Decryption in 20 multiplications of (128 \cdot 13 =) 1664-bit integers.
- Degree 2 polynomial multiplication
- Negated , signed Kronecker substitution to pack 128 coefficients into one integer.
"""
@classmethod
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def prec(cls , kyber):
"""
Return half the precision required by ‘‘Skipper4 ‘‘.
:param kyber: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
"""
return Skipper4.prec(kyber)/ZZ(2)
@classmethod
def muladd(cls , kyber , a, b, c, l=None):
"""
Compute ‘a \cdot b + c‘ using big -integer arithmetic
:param cls: Skipper class
:param kyber: Kyber class , inherit and change constants to change defaults
:param a: vector of polynomials in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param b: vector of polynomials in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param c: polynomial in ‘ZZ_q[x]/(x^n+1)‘
:param l: bits of precision
"""
m, k = 2, kyber.k
w = kyber.n//m
R, x = PolynomialRing(ZZ , "x"). objgen ()
f = R([1]+[0]*(w -1)+[1])
g = R([1]+[0]*(w//2 -1)+[1])
if l is None:
l = ceil(cls.prec(kyber))
R = PolynomialRing(ZZ, "x")
x = R.gen()
Ap = vector(R, k, [sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(a[j], m, i), f, 2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
for j in range(k)])
An = vector(R, k, [sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(a[j], m, i), f, -2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
for j in range(k)])
Cp = sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(c, m, i), f, 2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
Cn = sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(c, m, i), f, -2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
Bp = vector(R, k, [sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(b[j], m, i), f, 2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
for j in range(k)])
Bn = vector(R, k, [sum(cls.snort(cls.ff(b[j], m, i), f, -2**l) * x**i for i in range(m))
for j in range(k)])
F = 2**(w * l) + 1
# MUL: 2 * k * 3
Wp = (Ap*Bp + Cp) % F
Wn = (An*Bn + Cn) % F
We = (Wp+Wn) % F
Wo = (Wp -Wn) % F
Wo, We = (sum((Wo[0+i] + (2**l * We[m+i] % F))*x**i for i in range(m-1)) + Wo[m-1]*x**(m-1)) % F, \
(sum((We[0+i] + (2**l * Wo[m+i] % F))*x**i for i in range(m-1)) + We[m-1]*x**(m-1)) % F
_inverse_of_2_mod_F = F - 2**(w*l-1)
_inverse_of_2_to_the_l_plus_1_mod_F = F - 2**(w*l-1-l)
We = (We * _inverse_of_2_mod_F) % F
Wo = (Wo * _inverse_of_2_to_the_l_plus_1_mod_F) % F
D = [cls.sneeze(We[i] % F, g, 2**(2*l)) for i in range(m)]
D += [cls.sneeze(Wo[i] % F, g, 2**(2*l)) for i in range(m)]
d = []
for j in range(w//2):
for i in range (2*m):
d.append(D[i][j])
return R(d)
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